Deleuze, em Francis Bacon – Lógica da sensação, destaca três elementos pictóricos como características fundamentais das pinturas de Bacon: a estrutura material, a figura e o contorno que isola a figura. Esses elementos revelam que o tema do pintor é o sofrimento do homem moderno, sozinho em seu quarto. Sofrimento entendido como o tormento interior de um corpo imerso no caos, em um universo sem sentido. O artista exprime o “corpo vivido” em meio ao desmoronamento da ordem das coisas. (...) A sequela mais evidente desse ambiente insólito é a “extrema solidão da Figura”. Esse mundo retratado por Bacon, está atrelado à filosofia nietzschiana que descreve o mundo como “dionisíaco”, isto é, sem finalidade e sem propósito. Para Nietzsche, a “morte de Deus” evidencia o nada existencial e a supressão do sentido das coisas. O resultado mais imediato da constatação da “morte de Deus” é a solidão. Todavia, tanto para o artista, quanto para o filósofo, a solidão é ambígua: ou pode ser fonte de niilismo, de necessidade de fuga ou fonte de afirmação. Nesse trabalho, pretendemos confrontar as obras de Bacon, descritas por Deleuze, com a filosofia nietzschiana, destacando a significação que ambos atribuem à solidão como consequência da constatação do mundo-caos. (shrink)

Philosophical proponents of predictive processing cast the novelty of predictive models of perception in terms of differences in the functional role and information content of neural signals. However, they fail to provide constraints on how the crucial semantic mapping from signals to their informational contents is determined. Beyond a novel interpretative gloss on neural signals, they have little new to say about the causal structure of the system, or even what statistical information is carried by the signals. That means that (...) the predictive framework for perception can be relabeled in traditional, non-predictive terms, with no empirical consequences relevant to existing or future data. To the extent that neuroscientific research based on predictive processing is both innovative and productive, it will be due to the framework’s suggestive heuristic effects, or perhaps auxiliary empirical claims about implementation, rather than a difference in the information-processing structure that it describes. (shrink)

This essay is a review of Edward Feser’s Aquinas: A Beginner’s Guide. In the first part, the author summarizes the book’s five chapters, drawing attention to Feser’s application of Aquinas’s thought to contemporary philosophical problems. Part 2 is dedicated to Feser’s Thomistic analysis of Intelligent Design. The author explains Feser’s case and why Aquinas’s “Fifth Way,” which is often labeled a “design argument,” depends on a philosophy of nature that ID’s methods implicitly reject.

Against the position of professor rex martin ("the review of metaphysics," xxv, December 1971) it is argued that there is a conceptual link between disobedience and destruction of authority, As socrates argues; that socrates does not take obedience to law to be an absolute principle of action; that socrates in the two dialogues about his trial does not contradict himself on the question of obedience to the court; that socrates' argument from piety does not undermine his arguments from injury and (...) agreement. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe Moving Time metaphor and the Moving Ego metaphor are common in English speakers’ conceptualization of time. Previous research has suggested a broad range of factors influencing people’s...

Qu'est-ce que le temps? Cette question nous plonge forcément dans l'embarras. La physique refuse de la poser: elle mesure le temps et en propose diverses théories au sein desquelles nous ne reconnaissons pas le temps de notre monde. Renonçant elle aussi à le définir, la philosophie s'est généralement réfugiée dans la conscience du temps, mais sans rien nous dire du temps lui-même. Il y a pourtant bien un concept de temps qui ne doit rien à la conscience ni à l'ordre (...) cosmique, c'est celui de ce monde où nous vivons et dont nous parlons; celui par lequel se distinguent l'avant et l'après, celui qui nous fait dire que les êtres changent et que Pierre est en retard. Tout cela dépend, à notre échelle, du mobilier du monde commun. La philosophie peut ainsi reprendre l'analyse du concept de temps soutenue par toute la tradition, d'Aristote à Bergson, de Kant à David Lewis. Elle offre alors de nouvelles réponses à nos interrogations les plus classiques: Le devenir n'est-il qu'une illusion? Le passé existe-t-il ou n'est-il qu'un fantôme de la mémoire? Pourquoi le temps est-il irréversible? Devons-nous l'imaginer comme une flèche dirigée vers l'avenir ou comme un fleuve précipitant notre présent en passé? Ces problèmes n'ont pas épuisé leurs mystères. Au bout de l'enquête, il y a l'espoir d'éclairer ce qu'Einstein lui-même estimait être l'énigme du 'maintenant'"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Federal and state budgetary constraints continually challenge Medicaid. The effects of benefit cuts are common: long waiting lists for community‐based services, skeletonized drug formularies with unstable access to long‐term prescriptions, no psychiatric therapy for people immobilized by depression, and no more than fourteen days of acute hospitalization. Reimbursements may be so low that providers cannot hire qualified staff and must reduce services, close facilities, or refuse to take Medicaid altogether. Misguided efficiency policies may afflict some groups of patients as well. (...) Decisions to narrow access rights to publicly funded health care promote the perception that more broadly inclusive programs would be unwisely and unfairly generous. They also risk characterizing disability rights as “special,” confined to a narrow class of people who charitably ought not to be expected to provide for themselves. In contrast, on a philosophical view we have been exploring—one that addresses problems of justice under circumstances of injustice by pursuing rather than reducing inclusion—efforts like these are unjust. (shrink)

Attitudes toward mission agencies in general, and toward the United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in particular, were assessed using two 10-item scales completed by 833 recently ordained Anglican clergy from the UK. Clergy were generally positive toward mission agencies and willing for their churches to engage with them, but more reluctant to form personal links. Most clergy felt agencies should give priority to the relief of poverty and to development needs, rather than to spreading specifically Christian beliefs. (...) Results for the USPG indicated more uncertain responses than for mission agencies generally, which probably indicated a lower visibility for this agency among some clergy, especially evangelicals. (shrink)

This paper examines the role that population vulnerabilities play in insurance coverage for a representative sample of Latinos and Asians in the United States. Using data from the National Latino and Asian American Study (NLAAS), these analyses compare coverage differences among and within ethnic subgroups, across states and regions, among types of occupations, and among those with or without English language proficiency. Extensive differences exist in coverage between Latinos and Asians, with Latinos more likely to be uninsured. Potential explanations include (...) the type of occupations available to Latinos and Asians, reforms in immigration laws, length of time in the United States, and regional differences in safety-net coverage. Policy implications are discussed. (shrink)

Comte’s ideas were spread in Britain through the medium of J S Mill’s System of Logic. Positivism in this version was much like the original in France: it was an historical theory about the classification of knowledge through three progressive stages. Progress referred to both scientific knowledge and civilisation. Comte’s system omitted the subject of psychology, but Mill’s followers, G H Lewes and Alexander Bain, remedied this by incorporating this discipline into the Comtean canon as an evolutionary doctrine.Comte had excluded (...) psychology from the ranks of the sciences because it lacked independence. That is, the mind’s ability to alter its environment by use of volition or will meant that it was not the sort of phenomenon that was analyzable using scientific method. Lewes, in countering this idea, based psychology in biology so as to emphasise those aspect of the discipline that were analogous to other sciences. Lewes saw the mind as the brain and regarded volition as very much like a reflex action or an instinct that might be beyond the mind’s control. Lewes also faulted Comte or classifying knowledge in an intellectual system that was not drawn from science. In place of Comte’s stages, Lewes substituted Herbert Spencer’s empirically-based notion of “ascending complexity”. This developmental thesis was not based upon natural selection, but upon the theory that both biological organism and the mind developed increased functionality as they evolved.Leslie Stephen’s positivism, unlike Lewes’, was not based upon data from neurophysiology. Instead it was a philosophical defence of a secular school of philosophy that began with Hume and Bentham and stretched forward to Lewes and Spencer. Rather perversely for a self-proclaimed member of a school that included Bentham, Stephen’s chief purpose was to attack utilitarianism, which he regarded as the opposition to evolutionary philosophy. Utilitarianism, Stephen argued, attributed too great a role to the intellect at the expense of the feelings. In his view, the latter were the important factors in decision-making and they were analogous to instincts and not subject to a utilitarian calculus. (shrink)

PawPrints On Our Souls is dotted with belief facts, supported by quotes by prominent doctors, philosophers, writers, and celebrities, to build a strong case against vivisection, factory farming, and other animal abuses. Pawprints can be read in any order: Each fact and quote is separated by a double-space... So there's lots of white space for easy reading...

Pour relever le défi de l’irruption dans notre modernité d’une violence radicale, il faut, selon Éric Weil, inscrire la cohérence des discours dans l’espace premier du langage et de sa négativité créatrice. S’il est possible, alors, de procéder à une mise en ordre logique des divers types d’intelligibilité élaborés dans l’histoire, c’est en subordonnant l’ensemble de ces catégories concrètes aux deux catégories formelles du sens et de la sagesse, de la compréhension et de la vie selon la compréhension. La philosophie (...) se comprend ainsi dans le tout de la réalité qui se révèle en elle : sa systématicité dialogique a pour corollaire une ouverture sans réserve à l’extériorité du monde et de l’histoire. Cette transcendance dans l’immanence, à l’épreuve de la relativité de la condition, est-elle susceptible de rencontrer et d’accueillir l’attestation religieuse d’une transcendance absolue? C’est la question que l’on se risque à poser pour finir. In order to face the challenge of the irruption in our modernity of a radical violence, one must, according to Eric Weil, inscribe the coherence of discourses into the primary space of language and of its creative negativity. If it is possible, then, to proceed to put in logical order diverse types of intelligibility elaborated through history, it has to be by subordinating the whole of those concrete categories under the two formal categories of meaning and wisdom, of comprehension and of life in accordance with comprehension. Philosophy is thus understood within the whole of reality that reveals itself in it ; its systematic dialogical character has as a corollary an unreserved opening to the external character of the world and of history. Is this transcendence in immanence, while being proof resistant to the relativity of the condition, able to meet and receive the religious testimony of an absolute transcendence? Such is the question that is risked at the end. (shrink)

There has long been a history of studies investigating how people (“ordinary people”) perform on tasks that involve deductive reasoning. The upshot of these studies is that people characteristically perform some deductive tasks well but others badly. For instance, studies show that people will typically perform MP (“modus ponens”: from ‘If A then B’ and ‘A’, infer ‘B’) and bi-conditional MP (from: ‘A if and only if B’ and ‘A’, infer ‘B’) correctly when invited to make the inference and additionally (...) can discover of their own accord when such inferences are appropriate. On the other hand, the same studies show that people typically perform MT (“modus tollens”: from ‘If A then B’ and ‘not-B’, infer ‘not-A’) and biconditional MT badly. They not only do not recognize when it is appropriate to draw such inferences, but also they will balk at doing them even when they are told that they can make it. Related to these shortcomings seems to be the inability of people to understand that contrapositives are equivalent (that ‘If A then B’ is equivalent to ‘If not-B then not-A’). [Studies of people’s deductive inference-drawing abilities have a long history, involving many studies in the early 20th century concerning Aristotelian syllogisms. But the current spate of studies draws much of its impetus from Wason (Wason, 1968; see also Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972). ] The general conclusion seems to be that there are specific areas where “ordinary people” do not perform very logically. This conclusion will not come as a surprise to teachers of elementary logic, who have long thought that the majority of “ordinary people” are inherently illogical and need deep and forceful schooling in order to overcome this flaw. (shrink)